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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study markets involving many-to-many relationships that
can be expressed as contracts (see Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005). Relevant
examples of these markets are the market for part-time workers or the allo-
cation of specialty training slots for junior doctors in the UK. We find that
simple mechanisms where agents on one side of the market make take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers to the agents on the other side of the market are a robust way
to implement stable allocations in this setting. We apply our results to the
centralization of school admissions in a realistic many-to-many framework.
This finding is important. Many-to-many markets with contracts are a chal-
lenge for market design for several reasons. First, the nature of the contrac-
tual process makes these markets particularly complex. Also, centralizing the
allocation of contracts in this context is diﬃcult because no strategy-proof
mechanism (even for one side of the market) exists that is able to generate
stable allocations.
Many decentralized procedures share a simple structure. The agents on one
side of the market (hospitals) simultaneously make oﬀers to the agents on the
other side (doctors) that either accept or reject them. This market structure
is simple enough to promote participation while preventing the coordination
problems that might arise in this setting and often disrupting the decentral-
ized mechanism (see Triossi, 2009, and Romero-Medina and Triossi, 2014).
In this paper, we analyze the class of what we call take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers
mechanisms or TOM . This class includes all mechanisms such that in the
first stage, hospitals make simultaneous oﬀers to doctors, and then groups of
doctors sequentially accept or reject the oﬀers. The order in which doctors
choose can be arbitrary and even endogenous to the play, which is history
dependent.
To make the exposition more transparent and to guarantee the comparabil-
ity of our findings with previous results, we start by presenting the simplest
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mechanism in the TOM family, the simultaneous acceptance mechanism or
SAM . This procedure has two stages. In the first stage, hospitals simultane-
ously oﬀer contracts to doctors. In the second stage, doctors simultaneously
select from among the oﬀers received in the first stage.
Although simple, the SAM mimics the decentralized procedures used in labor
markets and college or school admissions. Therefore, our analysis contributes
to identifying the basic forces at work in these settings, and captures the
relevant interactions among hospitals and doctors.
We consider the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE from now on) in pure
strategies of the game induced by the SAM . In this game, doctors have a
unique best response: to accept the favorite set of contracts they are oﬀered.
We prove each SPE outcome of the game is a pairwise stable allocation
in this market without assumptions on the preferences of the agents. The
converse is not true. Even when the preferences are substitutable, there are
stable allocations that cannot be achieved as an SPE outcome of the SAM .
This finding uncovers an important strategic diﬀerence introduced by the
use of contracts in matching markets. Indeed, Echenique and Oviedo (2006)
find that in many-to-many matching markets without contracts and with
substitutable preferences, the set of stable matching coincides with the set
of SPE outcomes of the SAM . The logic of our results is simple: without
contracts, matching markets assign agents to agents. When contracts are
available, each hospital can negotiate the details of the relationship with
its counterparts. Therefore, ceteris paribus, each hospital will oﬀer only
its preferred contract from among the ones a doctor is willing to accept.
However, we prove that if enough competitive pressure is present, the SAM
implements the set of stable allocations, generalizing the results in Echenique
and Oviedo (2006).
Our findings highlight a problem that is both theoretical and conceptual.
Because the set of SPE outcomes can be a strict subset of the set of stable
allocations, the existence of stable allocations does not guarantee the game
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has an SPE in pure strategies.
To tackle this issue, we start by observing that the sequential game induced
by the SAM is equivalent to a simultaneous game   where only hospitals
play, and the outcome is obtained by replacing the doctors with their unique
best response (see Baron and Kalai, 1993). Then we prove an SPE in pure
strategies exists when hospitals have substitutable preferences and doctors
have unilateral substitutable preferences. This result extends the existence
of pairwise stable allocations beyond the case, previously analyzed in the
literature, of substitutable preferences (see Blair, 1988, Pepa Risma, 2015,
and Hatfield and Kominers, 2017).
We also show that if both sides of the market have substitutable preferences,
the sets of the SPE outcomes of the game constitute a lattice. The lattice
structure reflects an opposition of interests between the two sides of the
markets, within the equilibrium outcomes. This opposition of interests is
consistent with the one found in the set of stable allocations (see Blair, 1988,
and Pepa Risma, 2015). We also find a first-mover advantage absent in
the model without contracts. In fact, when the preferences of both sides of
the market are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand (see
Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005), the hospital-optimal stable allocation is an
SPE outcome while the doctor-optimal stable allocation might not be an
equilibrium outcome of the game.
After completing the study of the SAM , we extend our findings to the entire
TOM class, by proving all games in this class are equivalent. The set of
SPE outcomes of the game induced by the SAM coincides with the set of
SPE outcomes of the game induced by any of the mechanisms within the
TOM class.
To conclude the paper, we consider the possibility of building a centralized
assignment procedure able to result in stable allocations when the prefer-
ences of one side of the market are known and can be interpreted as prior-
ities. This scenario exists, for instance, in school admissions problems. We
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find the immediate acceptance mechanism guarantees the implementation of
stable allocations in many-to-many environments with responsive school pri-
orities because the game induced by the mechanism is equivalent to the game
induced by the SAM . If schools’ priorities are not responsive, the immedi-
ate acceptance mechanism fails to implement stable allocations. However, if
priorities are at least substitutable, the one shot immediate acceptance mech-
anism yields stable allocations. This result also relies on the equivalence of
the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism and the SAM .
This paper is rooted in the recent matching literature on sequential mecha-
nisms, both in many-to-many and many-to-one markets. In that sense, our
analysis on the SAM extends previous results on many-to-many matching
markets without contracts in Sotomayor (2004) and Echenique and Oviedo
(2006) to the framework of many-to-many matching markets with contracts.
Our analysis of sequential acceptances also extends the result on Romero-
Medina and Triossi (2014) from the many-to-one to the many-to-many frame-
work (see also Klaus and Kljin, 2016).
Although many-to-many relations are common in bilateral markets, the strate-
gic interaction of agents in decentralized many-to-many markets with con-
tracts has not been fully analyzed. We have already mentioned the specialty
training followed by junior doctors in the UK, where doctors have to arrange
separate medical residencies and training positions with several hospitals
(Roth, 1991) and part-time lecturers. However, we find additional exam-
ples in other labor markets, for example, the market for school teachers in
countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Italy. In these countries, teachers can
work simultaneously in more than one school under diﬀerent labor conditions.
Outside labor markets, we can mention relationships between health insurers
and health care providers and the ones between car producers and auto parts
suppliers as relevant examples of many-to-many markets with contracts.
The many-to-many framework can also be used to model the application
stage of decentralized many-to-one markets. For example, Yenmez (2015)
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models the college admissions problem in the United States as a many-
to-many matching model with contracts where applicants apply to several
colleges and receive several acceptances before investing in reaching a final
decision. In this model, students get diﬀerent acceptance packages with dif-
ferent tuition fees and financial aid packages (scholarships, loans, grants, and
work opportunities).
The school admissions problem has been traditionally studied as a many-to-
one problem. However, families may have more than one child, and students
can be admitted in diﬀerent conditions. In this case, the school admissions
problem becomes an example of a market with contracts that fits in the scope
of our analysis (see also Hatfield and Kominers, 2017).
Most of the markets we have mentioned are either totally or partially decen-
tralized. But some of them are centralized using a revelation mechanism as
the admission procedure in many school districts. However, the centralized
procedures in place either ignore or underplay the many-to-many aspect of
these markets. The analysis of decentralized procedures allows us to bet-
ter understand the problem. In particular, we consider the diﬀerent options
available to the designer in a realistic many-to-many school admissions prob-
lem with contracts. We provide alternative mechanisms to build a centralized
clearing house.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and no-
tation. Section 3 presents the SAM and the implementation results for this
mechanism. Section 4 extends our results to the class of TOM . Section 5
studies the possibility of centralizing the TOM family in markets with prior-
ities on one side of the market. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The proofs are
in the appendix.
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2 The Model
In our model, a set of doctors seeks positions at diﬀerent hospitals. The
(finite) sets of hospitals and doctors are denoted by H and D, respectively.
The set of agents will be denoted by N = H [D. There is a finite set X of
contracts. Each contract x 2 X is associated with one doctor xD 2 D and
one hospital xH 2 H. We assume each agent can sign multiple contracts. The
null contract is denoted by ;. An allocation is a set of contracts Y ✓ X. Let
Y be an allocation and let N 0 ✓ N . Let YN 0 = {y 2 Y | {yH , yD} \N 0 6= ;}
be the set of contracts that belong to Y and involve a member of N 0. With
abuse of notation, for all n 2 N , we will use Yn instead of Y{n}.
For each h 2 H,  h is a strict preference relation on {Y ✓ X | xH = h 8 x 2 Y }.
A contract is acceptable if it is strictly preferred to the null contract, and
unacceptable if it is strictly worse than the null contract. The set of contracts
that are acceptable to h is denoted by A ( h) = {x 2 X | x  h ;}. A prefer-
ence profile  h defines a choice function Ch (·). Formally, for each h 2 H and
Y ✓ X, we define Ch (Y ), the chosen set in Y , as Ch (Y ) = max h {Z ✓ Yh}.
Let CH (Y ) =
S
h2H Ch (Y ) be the set of contracts chosen from Y by some
hospital. Preference relations are extended to allocations in a natural way:
for all allocations Y, Z, Y  h Z means Yh  h Zh. For each d 2 Y ,  d,
A ( d), Cd, Yd, and CD are defined in the same way.
Each choice functions Cn is derived by a strict preference relation  n, for all
n 2 N ; then it satisfies IRC.1 Thus, for every Y ✓ X and every z 2 X \ Y ,
z /2 Cn (Y [ {z}) =) Cn (Y [ {z}) = Cn (Y ) .
We define  H= ( h)h2H ,  D= ( d)d2D and  =
 
( h)h2H , ( d)d2D
 
. The
quadruple M = (H,D,X, ) is called a matching market. We could model
many-to-one matching markets by assuming no doctor finds an allocation
1Sönmez and Aygün (2013) present a detailed analysis of this condition and its impli-
cations.
7
where she signs more than one contract to be acceptable. Formally, (H,D,X, )
is a many-to-one matching market if, for all allocations Y and for d 2 D such
that |Yd| > 1, we have ;  d Y .
We then define two partial orders  HB and  DB on the set of allocations,
that are usually called Blair’s orders.
Definition 1 Let Y and Z be allocations.
(i) The allocation Y is preferred to the allocation Z according to Blair’s
partial order for hospitals, or Y  HB Z if Ch (Yh [ Zh) = Yh for all h 2 H.
(ii) The allocation Y is preferred to the allocation Z according to Blair’s
partial order for doctors, or Y  DB Z if Cd (Yd [ Zd) = Yd for all d 2 D.
We assume each doctor can sign at most one contract with the same hospi-
tal, and vice versa. This assumption is called the “unitarity assumption” (see
Kominers, 2012) and it is common in the literature (but see Pepa Risma,
2015, and Hatfield and Kominers, 2017). We model the unitarity assump-
tion (UA) by assuming the allocations where an agent n 2 N signs more
than one contract with the same counterpart are not acceptable to n. For-
mally, we assume that if Y ✓ X is an allocation, and there exist y, z 2 Yh,
y 6= z for some h 2 H (resp. y, z 2 Yd y 6= z for some d 2 D) with yD = zD
(resp. yH = zH), then ;  h Y (resp. ;  d Y ).
2.1 Stability and substitutability
Stability is a key concept in market design. Gale and Shapley first intro-
duced it in their 1962 seminal paper. Theoretical and empirical findings
suggest markets that achieve stable outcomes are more successful than mar-
kets that do not achieve stable outcomes (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990,
and Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2013).
Stable allocations are identified by two requirements. The first requirement
is individual rationality. An allocation is individually rational if no agent
wants to unilaterally cancel any of the assigned contracts.
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Definition 2 An allocation Y is individually rational for agent n 2 N if
Cn (Y ) = Y n.
The second requirement is that the allocation must not be “blocked.” Intu-
itively, a coalition blocks an allocation when the members of the coalition
can profitably renegotiate the contracts of the allocations.
A coalition of agents can block a given allocation in a variety of forms.
Definition 3 Let Y be an allocation for matching marketM . A set of agents
N 0 = H 0 [D0, where H 0 ✓ H and D0 ✓ D:
• Pairwise blocks Y if H 0 = {h}, D0 = {d} and x 2 X \ Y exists such
that xD = d, xH = h and x 2 Ch (Y [ {x}) \ Cd (Y [ {x}).
• Blocks (Hatfield and Kominers, 2017) Y if a set of contracts Z 6= ;
exists such that
(i) Z \ Y = ;;
(ii) ZN 0 = N 0;
(ii) for all j 2 N 0, Zj ✓ Cj (Z [ Y ).
• Strongly blocks (Hatfield and Kominers, 2017) Y if a set of contracts
Z 6= ; exists such that
(i) Z \ Y = ;;
(ii) ZN 0 = N 0;
(ii) for all j 2 N 0, an individually rational Tj ◆ Zj exists such that
Tj  j Yj.
The previous blocking conditions imply the following stability concepts.
Definition 4 Let Y be an allocation for matching market M .
• Y is pairwise stable if it is individually rational and no coalition exists
that pairwise blocks it. The set of pairwise stable allocations is denoted
by PS (M).
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• Y is stable if it is individually rational and no coalition exists that blocks
it. The set of stable allocations is denoted by S (M).
• Y is strongly stable if it is individually rational and no coalition exists
that strongly blocks it. The set of strongly stable allocations is denoted
by SS (M).
As we move from pairwise stable allocation to strongly stable allocation, the
set of potential blocking coalitions enlarges. Therefore, the set of surviving
allocations shrinks. Thus, we have SS (M) ✓ S (M) ✓ PS (M).2
The set of pairwise stable, stable, and strongly stable allocations may be
empty. The literature has focused on preference restrictions that guarantee
the existence of stable allocations by avoiding complementarities among con-
tracts. Substitutability is a key condition for the existence of stable alloca-
tions. Next, we formally define substitutable preferences, and we present the
concepts of unilateral and strong substitutability. Unilateral substitutability
guarantees the existence of stable allocations in many-to-one matching mar-
kets at the time that allows some complementarities among the agents (see
Hatfield and Kojima, 2010 and Sönmez and Switzer, 2013).3 The condition of
strong substitutability is a strengthening of substitutability and was defined
by Echenique and Oviedo (2006) and studied in Klaus and Waltz (2009) and
Hatfield and Kominers (2017) in the case of matching with contracts.
Next, we present formally the diﬀerent concepts of substitutability from the
weakest to the strongest.
Definition 5 The preferences of hospital h,  h are unilaterally substitutable
if there does not exist contracts x, z 2 X and a set of contracts Y ✓ X such
2Klaus and Waltz (2009) present alternative stability concepts. They introduce weak
setwise stable allocations, setwise stable allocations, and strongly setwise stable allocations.
Hatfield and Kominers (2017) establish connections between these conditions and the
concepts of stable and strongly stable allocations.
3Hatfield and Kojima (2010) also present the weaker concept of bilateral substitutable
preferences.
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that zD /2 YD, z /2 Ch (Y [ {z}) and z 2 Ch (Y [ {x, z}).
The preferences of hospital h are unilaterally substitutable if, whenever h
rejects the contract z and that is the only contract with zD available, it still
rejects the contract z when the choice set expands. Unilateral substitutable
preferences are defined in the same way for doctors.
Definition 6 The preferences of hospital h,  h are substitutable if there
do not exist contracts x, z 2 X and a set of contracts Y ✓ X such that
z /2 Ch (Y [ {z}) and z 2 Ch (Y [ {x, z}).
The preferences of hospital h are substitutable if the addition of a contract
to the choice set never induces a hospital to accept a contract it previously
rejected. Substitutable preferences are defined in the same way for doctors.
Definition 7 The preferences of hospital h,  h are strongly substitutable
if, for all set of contracts Y, Z ✓ X such that Ch (Y )  h Ch (Z), we have
Z \ Ch (Y ) ✓ Ch (Z).
The preferences of hospital h are strongly substitutable if, whenever h chooses
a contract y from a set of contracts Y and y 2 Z, where Ch (Y ) is a better
set than Ch (Z), then h chooses y from Z as well. Strongly substitutable
preferences are defined in the same way for doctors.
In the paper, we also employ an additional condition called the “law of ag-
gregate demand.”
Definition 8 Let n 2 N . The preferences of agent n,  n satisfy the law of
aggregate demand if, for all Z ✓ Y ✓ X, |Cn (Z)|  |Cn (Y )|.
If the preferences of an agent satisfy the law of aggregate demand and new
contracts become available, the agent will choose a (weakly) larger number
of contracts.
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2.2 Subgame perfect implementation
An extensive-form matching mechanism is an array G = (N,X, I, S, g),
where N is the set of players, I is the set of histories, and S is the strategy
space. More precisely, S =
Q
n2N Sn, where Sn =
Q
i2I S
i
n for all n 2 N . Set
Si =
Q
n2N S
i
n. Histories and strategies are linked by the following property:
Si = {si | (i, si) 2 I}. An initial history i0 2 I exists, and every history i 2 I
is represented by a finite sequence (i0, s1, ..., sr 1) = ir. If ir+1 = (ir, sr) ,
history ir 1 precedes history ir and that history ir precedes history ir+1.
The set W = {w 2 I | there is no i 2 I proceeding w} is the set of terminal
histories. Given the initial history, every strategy profile s 2 S defines a
unique terminal history ws. The outcome function g : W ! X specifies
an outcome allocation for each terminal history, and hence for each strategy
profile s. With abuse of notation, we use g (s) to denote g (ws). Given  ,
(G, ) constitutes an extensive-form game. Every i 2 I \ W identifies a
subgame G (i) = (N, I (i) , S (i) , gi, ), where i is the initial history, I (i) =
{i0 2 I | i0 precedes i} and S (i) = Qi02I(i) Si0 . Let s 2 S (i). Given the initial
history i, strategy s specifies a unique terminal history, ws. The outcome
function is defined by gi (s) = g (ws). Given s 2 S and i 2 I, let s (i) 2 S (i)
be the strategy prescribed by s once i is reached. Formally, if s =
 
si
0 
i02I ,
then s (i) =
 
si
0 
i02I(i). With abuse of notation, we will identify a subgame
G (i) with its initial history i.
An SPE is a strategy profile that induces a Nash equilibrium in every
subgame. Formally, s⇤ is an SPE if for all i 2 I and for all n 2 N :
gi (s⇤ (i)) ⌫n gi
 
s0n, s
⇤
 n (i)
 
for all s0n 2 Sn (i). An allocation g (s⇤) is called
an SPE outcome of (G, ) , and the set of SPE outcomes of (G, ) is
denoted by SPE (G, ). Let M be a set of matching markets, and let
  : M ⇣ X be a correspondence. An extensive-form matching mecha-
nism G implements   in SPE if, for all M 2 M, SPE (G, ) =   (M),
which is if every SPE outcome of ( , ) belongs to   (H,D,X, ) and for
all contracts x 2   (M) , an SPE of (G, ) exists yielding x as outcome.
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An extensive-form matching mechanism G weakly implements   in SPE
if, for all M 2 M, SPE (G, ) 6= ; and SPE (G, ) 2   (M), which is if
every SPE outcome of (G, ) belongs to   (M). Throughout the paper, we
consider only equilibria in pure strategies.
3 Simultaneous Acceptance Mechanism
In this section, we analyze the simultaneous acceptance mechanism.
The SAM is a natural extension of the mechanism studied in Sotomayor
(2004) and Echenique and Oviedo (2006) to many-to-many matching mar-
kets with contracts. The game has two stages. In the first stage, hospitals
simultaneously oﬀer contracts to doctors. In the second and final stage si-
multaneously, each doctor chooses from among the oﬀers she receives, if any.
The contracts accepted in the second stage are enforced as an outcome of
the mechanism.
The SAM is described by the following procedure:
1. Oﬀers. Each hospital h oﬀers contracts to some doctors. Let X1 (h) ✓
Xh be the set of contracts oﬀered by hospital h. If h does not make
any oﬀer, then X1 (h) = ?. For all d 2 D, let X1 (d) =
 S
h2H X1(h)
 
d
be the set of oﬀers received by doctor d.
2. Choice. Each doctor selects a set of contracts from among the ones
she was oﬀered. Let X2(d) ✓ X1 (d) be the set of oﬀers d selects.
In the first stage of the game, the strategy set of hospital h is 2Xh .4 Ev-
ery subgame i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ) where doctors have to play is completely
characterized by sets of contracts proposed by each hospital. Formally,
i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ) is characterized by {X i1 (h)}h2H , where X i1 (h) is the set
of contracts that hospital proposed in the history preceding z. Let X i2 (d)
4Let Y be a set. By 2Y = {Z | Z ✓ Y } , we denote the set of all of its subsets.
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be the choice of doctor d at i. For all i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ) and every doctor
d 2 D, let X i1 (d) =
 S
h2H X
i
1(h)
 
d
be the set of oﬀers doctor d receives in
this subgame. We will use {X i2 (d)}d2D to denote the profile of strategies of
the doctors at subgame i 2 I \ (i0 [W ).
A strategy is given by s =
✓
(X1 (h))h2H , (X
i
2 (d))
i2I\({i0}[W)
d2D
◆
.
3.1 Results
We first characterize doctors’ optimal behavior. At the second stage of the
game, doctors have a unique best response, namely, to accept the best set of
contracts from among the ones being oﬀered. Formally:
Lemma 1 Consider the game induced by the SAM when preferences are
 . Then doctors have a unique best response: X⇤i2 (d) = Cd (X i1 (d)) for all
d 2 D and all i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ).
First, we show that any SPE of the game is pairwise stable regardless of the
agents’ preferences.
Proposition 1 All SPE outcomes of the game induced by the SAM are
pairwise stable allocations.
If all agents have substitutable preferences, the set of pairwise stable alloca-
tions coincides with the set of stable allocations (see Hatfield and Kominers,
2017). If one side of the market has strongly substitutable preferences and
the other side of the market has substitutable preferences, the set of pairwise
stable allocations coincides with the set of strongly stable allocations (see
Hatfield and Kominers, 2017). Therefore, our results partially extend the
findings of Echenique and Oviedo (2006) to the framework of matching with
contracts.
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Corollary 1 (i) If  H and  D are substitutable, all the SPE outcomes of
the game induced by the SAM are stable allocations.
(ii) If  H (resp.  D) are strongly substitutable and  D (resp.  H) are
substitutable, all the SPE outcomes of the game induced by the SAM
are strongly stable allocations.
Proof. The first claim follows from our Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in
Hatfield and Kominers (2017).
The second claim follows from our Proposition 1 and Theorem 3 in Hatfield
and Kominers (2017).
In the case of non-substitutable preferences, we can find SPE outcomes that
are pairwise stable, but not stable as the following example shows.
Example 1 Let us assume H = {h1, h2} and D = {d1, d2}. Let xr and x˜r
denote contracts between d1 and hr, r = 1, 2. Let zr and z˜r denote contracts
between d2 and hr, r = 1, 2. Assume the preferences of the agents are the
following:
 hr : {xr, zr} , {x˜r} , {z˜r} , {xr} , {zr} , r = 1, 2;
 d1 : {x1} , {x˜2} , {x˜1} , {x2} ;
 d2 : {z1} , {z˜1} , {z˜2} , {z2} .
The preferences of the hospitals are not substitutable. The SAM yields
{x˜2, z˜1} as SPE outcome, which is pairwise stable but not stable.
3.1.1 Markets with and without contracts
We can define a many-to-many matching market without contracts as a mar-
ket where |Xh \Xd| = 1 for all h 2 H and d 2 D. Echenique and Oviedo
(2006) analyze the SAM in this framework (see also Sotomayor, 2004). With-
out contracts, the SAM implements the set of stable allocations in SPE
when both sides of the market have substitutable preferences (Echenique
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and Oviedo, 2006, Theorem 7.1). In addition, if one side of the market has
strongly substitutable preferences, the SAM implements the set of strongly
stable allocations in SPE (Echenique and Oviedo, 2006, Theorem 7.2).
Both results rely on the fact that, in the model without contracts, hospitals
only choose whom to make the oﬀer to. Contracts introduce new strategic
considerations. With contracts, hospitals can also renegotiate the terms of
the collaboration with the doctors. Intuitively, a hospital can always oﬀer a
doctor the worst conditions (e.g., the lowest salary) she is willing to accept.
Therefore, hospitals benefit from a first-mover advantage. The following
example shows the set of SPE allocations of the game induced by SAM
does not include all stable allocations.
Example 2 Let us assume H = {h} and D = {d}. Let xi, x0i, x˜ denote con-
tracts between hospital h and doctor d. Assume the preferences of the agents
are the following:
 d: {x} , {x0} , {x˜} ;
 h: {x˜} , {x0} , {x}.
We can assume that, for example, xi, x0i and x˜ are contracts that pay a salary
of $200,000, $175,000, and $150,000 a year, respectively, and all other con-
tract terms are identical.
In Example 2, the hospital prefers to pay less and the doctor prefers to be
paid more. Only the $150,000 contract is an SPE outcome of the SAM
mechanism where the hospital makes the oﬀer. Only the $200,000 contract
is an SPE outcome of the SAM mechanism where the doctor makes the
oﬀer.5 The set of SPE allocations depends on who is making the oﬀers.
Therefore, Example 2 highlights another diﬀerence that emerges from the
5One might conjecture the set of stable allocations is the union of the SPE outcomes
of the game where hospitals make oﬀers and of SPE outcomes of the game where doctors
make oﬀers. This conjecture is not true. Notice that in Example 2, the $175,000 contract
is not an SPE outcome of any of the two games.
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use of contracts. When no contracts exist, the set of SPE allocations is
independent of who makes the oﬀers.
Notice that in Example 2, the contracts where the doctor is paid $175,000 and
$200,000 are unilaterally renegotiable by hospital h, when making the oﬀers.
Unilateral renegotiation of contracts undoubtedly plays a role in shaping
the set of SPE outcomes. Still, this property does not fully characterize
implementable allocations. Indeed, allocations exist that can be unilaterally
renegotiated by a hospital and are SPE outcomes as shown by the following
example.
Example 3 Let us assume H = {h1, h2} and D = {d1, d2}. Let x1 and x˜1
denote contracts between h1 and d1. Let x2 denote a contract between h2 and
d1. Let z denote a contract between h2 and d2. Assume the preferences of
the agents are the following:
 h1 : {x˜1} , {x1} ;
 h2 : {x2} , {z2} ;
 d1 : {x1} , {x2} , {x˜1} ;
 d2 : {z2} .
A unique stable allocation {x1, z2} exists. The allocation could be unilaterally
renegotiated by hospital h1 by oﬀering x˜1 instead of x1. However, the strate-
gies X1 (h1) = {x1, x˜1}, X1 (h2) = {x2, z2} jointly with the fact that a doctor
selects the best set of contracts among the ones she was oﬀered are an SPE
yielding {x1, z2} as an outcome of the game induced by SAM .
Examples 2 and 3 highlight the diﬀerences that emerge from the use of con-
tracts. These diﬀerences lie in the structure both of the market and of the
mechanism. Each hospital has to negotiate the nature of the relationship
with the doctors, and the mechanism provides the hospitals with a first-
mover advantage. In this case, the threat of other hospitals’ counteroﬀers
helps in increasing competition and sustaining stable outcomes as shown in
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Example 3.6 The idea that the potential entry of new competitors helps
in sustaining eﬃcient outcomes is not new to economics, and bears relation
to the concept of contestable markets (see Baumol et al., 1982). We thus
provide the following definition.
Definition 9 The market (H,D,X, ) satisfies contestability if, for any
individually rational allocation Y , such that there exist x 2 X \ Y and
y 2 Y such that x 2 Ch (Y [ {x}) \ Cd (Y \ {y} [ {x}), where h = xH ,
d = xD, then there exists a contract x0 2 Xd, x0 2 Cd (Y \ {y} [ {x, x0}),
x /2 Cd (Y \ {y} [ {x, x0}), x0 /2 Cd (Y [ {x, x0}).
The essence of the contestability condition is the existence of the threat of a
deviation that introduces a potential competitive pressure and allows for full
implementability of the set of stable allocations.
Proposition 2 Assume the market satisfies contestability, and the prefer-
ences of the agents are substitutable; then every stable allocation is an SPE
outcome of the game induced by the SAM . Therefore, under contestability,
the SAM implements the set of stable allocations in SPE.
In the absence of contracts, each allocation is an agreement only on the iden-
tities of the counterparts. Thus, the contestability condition holds emptily,
and Proposition 2 extends Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 in Echenique and Oviedo
(2006).
Alcalde et al. (1998) prove the implementability of stable allocations in
SPE in a many-to-one matching model with money a la Kelso and Crawford
(1982). They use a mechanism that is very similar to the SAM . Their model
satisfies contestability, because they assume that at least two firms exist,
each firm finds every worker acceptable, and firms can make arbitrarily high
6Hatfield and Kominers (2017) prove the theoretical possibility of implementing the set
of stable allocations in NE, although employing Maskin mechanisms.
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oﬀers. These assumptions allow them to sustain SPE, preventing unilateral
deviation with the threat of a suﬃciently high oﬀer. We cannot extend these
assumptions in our framework, because the set of contracts is finite, and
we do not assume contracts between every firm and worker are feasible or
acceptable. Therefore, the contestability condition is more demanding in our
framework.
3.1.2 Equilibrium existence
In general, as Example 2 shows, not every stable allocation is an SPE out-
come of the game induced by SAM . Therefore, the existence of stable allo-
cations is not able to guarantee the existence of an SPE in pure strategies
of the game induced by SAM .
We will prove the existence of equilibria directly, without relying on previous
existence results, by using a lattice theoretical argument. To simplify the
analysis, considering the normal form game  , where the set of the players is
H, the strategy space of the hospital h is Sh = 2Xh , and the outcome function
is g
 
(Sh)h2H
 
= CD
 S
h2H Sh
 
,   =
⇣
H, H ,
 
2Xh
 
h2H , g
⌘
is useful. Thus,
from Lemma 1, it follows directly that a one-to-one correspondence exists
between the NE of   and the SPE of the game induced by the SAM .
Lemma 2 The strategy profile
✓
(S⇤h)h2H , (S
⇤i
d )
i2I\({i0}[W)
d2D
◆
is an equilib-
rium of the game induced by the SAM if and only if (S⇤h)h2H is a Nash
equilibrium of  .
Let S h be a strategy profile for all the hospitals but h. Let Fh (S h) =n
x 2 Xh | x 2 CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘o
be the set of contracts that would be
accepted if they were oﬀered by h, when the other hospitals oﬀer contracts
in
S
h0 6=h Sh0 . Let Rh (Sh, Sh h) =
 
x 2 Xh | x /2 CD
 S
h02H Sh0 [ {x}
  
be
the set of contracts of agent h that would be rejected if they were of-
fered by h jointly with the contracts in
S
h02H Sh0 . Notice Fh (S h) = Xh \
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Rh (;, Sh h). Let us define brh (S h) = Ch (Fh (S h)) and BRh (S h) =
brh (S h)[Rh (brh (S h) , S h). Finally, setBRH
 
(Sh)h2H
 
= (BRh (S h))h2H .
We first characterize the structure of the best response correspondence of
game  , by proving brh (S h) = Ch (Fh (S h)) and BRh (S h) = brh (S h) [
Rh (brh (S h) , S h) are the minimal and the maximal best response, respec-
tively.
Lemma 3 Let ( d)d2D be a profile of preferences for doctors. Then Yh is a
best response to S h in   if and only if
brh (S h) ✓ Yh ✓ BRh (S h) .
The result on Lemma 3 characterizes the hospitals best responses in game  
when the SAM is used.
The next step is to prove the existence of equilibrium when hospitals have
substitutable preferences and doctors have unilateral substitutable prefer-
ences. The strategy of proof is to provide an increasing selection of the best
response correspondence and apply the Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem. First,
we order the strategy space using the product of the natural set order, ✓.
Because the minimal best response function brh (·) is non-increasing, a nat-
ural choice would be the maximal best response BRh (·). However, BRh (·)
is not increasing as the following example shows.
Example 4 Let us assume H = {h1, h2} and D = {d1, d2}. Let xi, x0i denote
contracts between hospital hi and doctor d1, for r = 1, 2. Let yi denote con-
tracts between hospital hi and doctor d2, for r = 1, 2. Assume the preferences
of the agents are the following:
 d1 : {x01, x2} , {x1, x02} , {x1, x2} , {x01, x02} , {x01} ,{x1} , {x02} , {x2};
 d2 : {y1} , {y2};
 h1 : {y1, x1} , {y1, x01} , {x1} , {x01} {y1};
 h2 : {y2} , {x01} , {y1}.
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Notice  x is unilaterally substitutable but not substitutable, because x1 2
Cx ({x1, x01, x02}) but x1 /2 Cx ({x1, x01}).
Now consider the following strategies for hospital h2, Sh2 = {;} and S 0h2 =
{x02}. We have Fh1 (Sh2) = {y1, x1, x01} and BRh1 (Sh2) = {x1, x01, y}. We
have Fh1
 
S 0h2
 
= {y, x1, x01} and BRh1
 
S 0h2
 
= {x1, y}. Then BRh1
 
S 0h2
  ✓
BRh1 (Sh2), but Sh2 ✓ S 0h2. It follows that BRh1 (·) is not monotonic.
AlthoughBRH (·) is not increasing, in general, it can be shown thatBrh (S h) =
brh (S h) [ (Xh \ Fh (S h)) is an increasing selection of the best response
correspondence when  H are substitutable and  D are unilaterally substi-
tutable. This finding allows us to prove the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume  H are substitutable and  D are unilaterally sub-
stitutable. Then the game induced by the SAM has a SPE. Therefore, the
SAM mechanisms weakly implement the set of pairwise stable allocations in
SPE.
Proposition 3 also provides a new existence result for stable allocations in
many-to-many matching markets with contracts, which extends Hatfield and
Kominers (2017).
Corollary 2 Assume  H are substitutable and  D are unilateral substi-
tutable. Then the set of pairwise stable allocations is non-empty.
Consider the two following algorithms:
ho Algorithm
Step 0:
(X0)h = ; for all h 2 H;
Step r   1:
(Xr+1)h = Brh
 
(Xr) h
 
for all h 2 H.
Set Xho =
S
h2H (Xr¯)h, where r¯ = min {r | (Xr)h = (Xr+1)h for all h 2 H}.
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hp Algorithm
Step 0:
(X0)h = Xh for all h 2 H;
Step r   1:
(Xr+1)h = Brh
 
(Xr) h
 
for all h 2 H.
Set Xhp =
S
h2H (Xr¯)h, where r¯ = min {r | (Xr)h = (Xr+1)h for all h 2 H}.
The monotonicity of the operator Brh (·) used to prove Proposition 3 implies
both algorithms stop in a finite number of steps at pairwise stable allocations.
Notice that if the agents on one side of the market have unilateral substi-
tutable preferences, pairwise stability and stability are not equivalent, as
shown by the following example.
Example 5 Let us assume H = {h} and D = {d1, d2, d3}. Let xr be a
contract between h and d1, let yr be a contract between h and d2, and let zr
be a contract between h and d3, for r = 1, 2. Assume the preferences of the
agents are the following:
 h: {x1, y1, z1} , {x2, y1, z2} , {x2, y1, z1} , {x2, y1, z2}, {x1, y1, z1} , {x2, y1, z2} ,
{x2, y1, z1}, {x2,y1,z2} , {x2, y1} , {x1, y1} , {y1, z2} , {y1, z1} ,
{y1} , {x1} , {x2} , {z1} , {z2} ;
 d1 : {x1} , {x2};
 d2 : {y1} , {y2} ;
 d3 : {z1} , {z2}.
Preferences  h are unilateral substitutable but not substitutable, because z1 /2
Ch ({y1, z1, z2}) but z1 2 Ch ({x1, x2, y1, z1, z2}). The allocation Y = {y1, x2, z2}
is pairwise stable but not stable, because it is blocked by N 0 = {h, d1, d3}
through Z = {x1, z1}.
When one side of the market has unilateral substitutable preferences, the
set of pairwise stable allocations might not be a lattice. Moreover, under
the same assumptions, the set of SPE is not even a lattice with respect to
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the joint preferences of the agents or Blair’s order (see Blair, 1988), as can
be seen in the following example that we borrow from Hatfield and Kojima
(2010).
Example 6 Let us assume H = {h} and D = {d1, d2}. Let x1, x2, x3 denote
the contracts between d1 and h, and let y1, y2, y3 denote the contracts between
d2 and h. Assume the preferences of the agents are the following:
 h: {x1, y3} , {x3, y1} ,{x2, y2} , {x3, y3} , {x3, y2} , {x2, y3} ,{x2, y1} , {x1, y2},
{x1, y1} , {x3} ,{y3} , {x2} , {y2} , {x1} , {y1};
 d1 : {x2} , {x1} , {x3};
 d2 : {y2} , {y1} , {y3}.
This market contains three pairwise stable allocations, X1 = {x2, y2}, X2 =
{x3, y1} , and X3 = {x1, y3} , that are also SPE outcomes. However, as
observed in Hatfield and Kojima (2010), {X1, X2, X3} is not a lattice with
respect to the order induced by  D and not even with respect to the Blair’s
order.
3.1.3 The structure of the set of SPE outcomes
In this section, we restrict our attention to markets where the preferences of
both sides of the market are substitutable. We first prove that, under this
assumption, the maximal best response BRh (·) is increasing.
Lemma 4 Assume  H and  D are substitutable. Then the maximal best
response function BRh (·) is increasing: if Sh ✓ S 0h for all h 2 H, then
BRh (S h) ✓ BRh
 
S 0 h
 
for all h 2 H.
Lemma 4 implies the set of fixed points of BRH (·) is a non-empty lattice.
To apply this result to our environment, we prove all SPE outcomes of the
game induced by the SAM are generated by the set of fixed points of the
maximal best response.
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Lemma 5 Assume  H and  D are substitutable. The allocation Y is an
NE outcome of   if and only if a strategy profile (Sh)h2H exists such that
BRH
 
(Sh)h2H
 
= (Sh)h2H and CD
 S
h2H Sh
 
= Y .
Lemma 5 does not extend to every selection of the best response correspon-
dence; for instance, it does not extend to the minimal best response, as shown
by the following example.
Example 7 Consider Example 3. The unique stable allocation {x1, z2} is
not a fixed point of the minimal best response, (brh (·))h2H , because brh ({z2}) =
x˜1. Thus, {x1, z2} cannot be obtained from a fixed point of the minimal best
response.
Lemma 5 shows the structure of the fixed points of BRH (·) reflects the
structure of the set of SPE outcomes and allows us to prove the set of SPE
outcomes of the SAM mechanism is a lattice according to Blair’s orders.
Furthermore, an opposition of interests within the set of SPE allocations
emerges. Given two SPE outcomes Y and Z, if Y dominates Z, according
to hospitals’ Blair’s order, Z dominates Y according to doctors’ Blair’s order.
Proposition 4 Let us assume  H and  D are substitutable.
(i) The set of SPE of the game induced by the SAM is a non-empty lattice
with Blair’s orders  HB and  DB.
(ii) Let Y, Z be SPE outcomes. Then Y  HB Z if and only if Z  DB Y .
As in the case of Proposition 3, Proposition 4 also provides the following
algorithms to compute pairwise stable allocations.
HO Algorithm
Step 0:
(X0)h = ; for all h 2 H;
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Step r   1:
(Xr+1)h = BRh
 
(Xr) h
 
for all h 2 H.
Set XHO =
S
h2H (Xr¯)h, where r¯ = min {r | (Xr)h = (Xr+1)h for all h 2 H}.
HP Algorithm
Step 0:
(X0)h = Xh for all h 2 H;
Step r   1:
(Xr+1)h = BRh
 
(Xr) h
 
for all h 2 H.
Set XHP =
S
h2H (Xr¯)h, where r¯ = min {r | (Xr)h = (Xr+1)h for all h 2 H}.
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply the outcome of the HO algorithm coincides with
the best (resp. worst) SPE outcome for hospitals (resp. doctors), and the
HP algorithm coincides with the worst (resp. best) SPE outcome for hos-
pitals (resp. doctors).7 A DO algorithm and a DP algorithm can be defined
symmetrically considering the game where the doctors make the oﬀers. Fu-
ture research should compare the eﬃciency of these algorithms and of the
cumulative oﬀer mechanism (see Hatfield and Kominers, 2017).
The existence of contracts provides hospitals with a first-mover advantage as
shown in Example 2. This eﬀect shrinks the set of SPE allocations through
unilateral deviations, and hurts doctors more than hospitals. Indeed, al-
though the doctor-optimal stable allocation can be excluded from the set of
SPE outcomes, as we have seen in Example 2, the hospital-optimal stable
allocation is always an SPE outcome.
Proposition 5 Assume  D are substitutable and  H are substitutable and
satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Then the hospital-optimal stable alloca-
tion is an SPE outcome.
7The same result does not hold with the ho and the hp algorithm, because, in general,
the set of fixed points of (Brh (·))h2H does not coincide with the set of NE outcomes of
the game  .
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Consider a many-to-one situation where each hospital can hire at most one
doctor. If  D does not satisfy the law of aggregate demand, the hospital-
optimal stable allocation is not strategy-proof for hospitals (see Hatfield and
Milgrom, 2005). However, Proposition 5 implies that it is an NE outcome
of the SAM .
When preferences are substitutable and the preferences of hospitals satisfy
the law of aggregate demand, the outcome of the HO algorithm coincide with
the hospital-optimal stable allocation. When no contracts exist, the SAM
fully implements the set of stable allocations (see Echenique and Oviedo,
2006), and the outcome of the HP algorithm coincides with the doctor-
optimal stable allocation.
4 Take-It-Or-Leave-It Oﬀers Mechanisms
We now introduce the class of take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers mechanisms.
This class extends the SAM by relaxing the assumption that the agents
accept the proposals they receive simultaneously. The TOM are such that,
in a first stage, hospitals make simultaneous oﬀers to doctors. Then groups
of doctors sequentially accept or reject the oﬀers they received. Doctors in
the same group choose simultaneously. The order of choice can be arbitrary
and/or endogenous to the play, which is history dependent. The contracts
accepted in the choice stage are enforced as an outcome of the mechanism.
The take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers mechanisms are described by the following
procedure:
Oﬀers. Each hospital h oﬀers contracts to some doctors. Let X1 (h) ✓ Xh
be the set of contracts oﬀered by hospital h. If h does not make any
oﬀer, then X1 (h) = ?. For all d 2 D, let X1 (d) =
 S
h2H X1(h)
 
d
, be
the set of oﬀers received by doctor d.
Choice. At node i 2 I, a subset of doctors Di ✓ D that did not choose
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before selects a set of contracts from among the ones she was oﬀered.
Let X i2(d) ✓ X1 (d) be the set of oﬀers selected by doctor d 2 Di. The
procedure follows until all doctors have chosen.
Formally, a TOM is an extensive-form mechanism T = (N,X, I, S, g) with
the following characteristics. At the initial history i0, Si0 =
Q
h2H 2
Xh .8 Let
i be a successor of i0, i =
 
i0, (X i1 (h))h2H
 
and let X i1 (d) =
 S
h2H X
i
1(h)
 
d
.
For any non-initial or terminal node i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ), there exists Di ✓ D
such that, if i0 proceeds i, then Di0 \ Di = ; and Si2I\({i0}[W )Di = D.
For all i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ), let i1 (i) be the unique successor of i0 preceding
i. At each i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ) , the strategy space is Qd2Di 2Xi(d), where
X i (d) = X i
1(i)
2 (d).
Notice that in a TOM, the strategy space of a doctor d depends only on
the oﬀer she receives at Stage 0. In her turn, every doctor has a strictly
dominant strategy, which is to accept the best oﬀers that she receives. Let
T be a TOM, and consider the game induced by T when preferences are  .
Lemma 6 Doctors have a unique best response X⇤i2 (d) = Cd
⇣
X i
1(i)
1 (d)
⌘
for
all d 2 D, for all i 2 I \ ({i0} [W ).
The result is analogous to Lemma 1. Notice the result implies the set of SPE
outcomes coincides with the set of NE outcomes of game  . Therefore, we
have
Proposition 6 The set of SPE outcomes of T coincides with the set of
SPE outcomes of the SAM .
In particular, all the results of Section 3 extend to all the mechanisms on the
class of TOM .
8Notice we are abusing notation. In order to be completely consistent with the defini-
tion of an extensive-form mechanism, we should write, for instance, Si
0
=
Q
h2H 2
Xh ⇥Q
d2D {d}, meaning that doctors, at this stage, do not have any choice to make.
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Corollary 3 Let (H,D,X, ) be a matching market and let T be a TOM .
Then
a) All SPE outcomes of the game induced by the T are pairwise stable allo-
cations.
b) If preferences are substitutable, all SPE outcomes of the game induced by
T are stable allocations.
c) If  H are substitutable and  D are unilateral substitutable, the game in-
duced by the T has an SPE.
d) If   are substitutable, the set of SPE outcomes of the game induced by
the T outcomes is a non-empty lattice with respect to Blair’s order.
e) If  H are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand and  D
are substitutable, the hospital-optimal stable allocation is an SPE outcome
of the game induced by T .
5 Centralized Markets
In many markets, clearing houses are already in use, as is the case, for in-
stance, with the school admission procedures in place in many school dis-
tricts. As mentioned in the introduction, a many-to-many matching market
with contracts is arguably the most accurate representation of school admis-
sion models given that a significant number of families have more than one
child and diﬀerent arrangements between schools and families are possible
(e.g., diﬀerent tuition fees, schedules, lunch options, or grants). However,
school admission problems have been modeled as a many-to-one matching
market, allowing for minor adjustments on school priorities to favor siblings.
Let us now consider the problem of centralizing the assignment of students to
schools as a many-to-many matching market with contracts. The objective
is to provide a centralized mechanism able to implement stable allocations.
Because no strategy-proof, stable revelation mechanism exists in this frame-
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work, we pursue the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes.
To maintain the concordance with the rest of the paper, we call the agents on
each side of the market hospitals and doctors, respectively. As is usual in this
case (see, e.g., Ergin and So¨nmez, 2006, and Haeringer and Klijn, 2009), we
assume the hospital priorities are known to doctors, and we consider strategic
behavior only among the latter.
Formally, the problem is characterized by the following:
• a set of hospitals H,
• a set of doctors D,
• a vector of quotas (qh)h2H , where qh is a positive integer that represents
the number of doctors hospital h 2 H can sign,
• a set of contracts X,
• a strict priority structure  H , where, for all h 2 H,  h is a strict order
over Xh [ {;},
• for all doctors d 2 D, a strict preference profile  d over X [ {;} .
We need to extend hospitals’ priorities over doctors to priorities over sets of
doctors. To do so, we assume that priorities over a set of doctors are respon-
sive to priorities over individual doctors. Formally, we say the profile  ˜H is
responsive to the priority structure  H with a vector of quotas (qh)h2H if
for all h and all Yh ✓ Xh, x, z 2 X\Y : (i) if |Yh| < qh, then Y [{x}  ˜hY [{z}
if and only if x  h z, (ii) Y [ {x}  ˜hY if and only if x  h A ( h), and (iii)
if |Yh| > qh, then ; ˜hY .
Responsive priorities are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate de-
mand, so our previous results extend to this framework.
Contrary to the previous sections, from now on, we consider TOM mech-
anisms where doctors make the proposals, because we are interested in de-
signing an admission mechanism for doctors.
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It is a well-known fact (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) that, in a many-to-
many framework, no stable revelation mechanism exists where truth-telling
is a dominant strategy for the agents on either side of the market. Thus, we
turn our attention to the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
A natural candidate for the centralization is the doctor-optimal stable mech-
anism. However, it may produce unstable allocations as NE outcomes (see
Haeringer and Klijn, 2009). An alternative to the doctor-optimal stable
mechanism is the DO algorithm. However, even if the DO algorithm does
not coincide with the cumulative oﬀer algorithm, its outcome coincides with
the doctor-optimal stable allocation when preferences are substitutable and
satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
Alternatively, we can focus on the incentives provided by the so-called imme-
diate acceptance mechanism (see Alcalde, 1996), also known as the Boston
mechanism (see Abdulkadiroğlu and So¨nmez, 2003).
First, let us define the immediate acceptance mechanism for the many-
to-many matching markets with contracts that we analyze. The strategy
space of doctor d is the set of strict rational preferences over 2Xd , L  2Xd .
Given a preference for doctor d,  d over 2Xd and an integer r, 1  r 
  2Xd  ,
let Y r d be the r
th ranked acceptable set according to  d, when one exists. Let
Y r d be empty otherwise. Formally, Y = Y
r
 d if and only if Y ✓ Xd, Y  d ;
and |{Z ✓ Xd | Z  d Y }| = r   1. Set Y r d = ; if |{Z ✓ Xd | Z  d Y }| =
r   1 =) ; ⌫d Y .
The following procedure describes the immediate acceptance mecha-
nism.
• Step 1: Only the top acceptable choices of the doctors at  D are con-
sidered. Set A1 =
S
d2D Y
1
 d and set Y
1 = CH (A1). Contracts in Y 1 are
signed. Every doctor who has signed a contract and every doctor who
has proposed the empty set, that is, every d 2 Y 1D[
 
d 2 D | Y 1 d = ;
 
,
is removed from the market. Let D2 = D \ Y 1D be the set of remaining
doctors.
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• Step r, r   2: Only the rth choices of doctors in Dr are considered, and
hospitals decide which contracts to add to the ones selected at step r 1,
compatibly with the already signed contracts. Set Ar =
S
d2Dr 1 Y
r
 d ,
for all h 2 H, set Y r,h = max h
n
Y ✓ Xh | Y r 1,hh ✓ Y ✓ Y r 1,h [ Arh
o
.
Finally set Y r =
S
h2H Y
r,h [ Y r 1. Contracts in Y r are signed. Every
doctor who has signed a contract and every doctor who has proposed
the empty set, that is, every d 2 Y rD [
 
d 2 Dr | Y r d = ;
 
, is removed
from the market. Let Dr+1 = D \Y rD[
 
d 2 Dr 1 | Y r d = ;
 
be the set
of remaining doctors. The procedure stops at r⇤ = min {r | Dr = ;}.
Let Y = Y r⇤ be the final outcome.
Let IA ( D, H) be the outcome of the algorithm when doctors submit pref-
erence profile D and the profile of hospital priority is  H . The game induced
by the immediate acceptance mechanism is IA=  D, D,L  2Xd  , IA (·, H) .
We consider the game   introduced in Section 3.1.2, where doctors make pro-
posals.
Proposition 7 Assume  D are substitutable and  H are responsive; then
the set of NE outcomes of   coincides with the set of NE outcomes of IA.
Thus, the set of NE outcomes of the immediate acceptance mechanism is
a non-empty lattice of stable allocations that includes the doctor-optimal
stable allocation.9
Unfortunately, in situations where priorities are not responsive (e.g., in cases
involving budget constraints; see, e.g., Mongell and Roth, 1986, and Abizade,
2016, or when students are ranked using scores systems that give extra points
to siblings simultaneously entering a new school), the immediate acceptance
mechanism may fail to implement even individually rational allocations.
Example 8 Let us assume H = {h1, h2} and D = {d1, d2, d3, d4}.
9The result follows from Corollary 1, Proposition 4, and Proposition 5.
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Priorities and preferences are the following:
 h1 : {d1, d3} , {d1d2, d3} , {d2, d3} , {d1, d2} , {d1} , {d3} , {d2} ;
 h2 : {d4} , {d1} ;
 d1 : {h2} , {h1} ;
 d2 : {h1} ;
 d3 : {h1} ;
 d4 : {h2} ;
The outcome of truth-telling in the immediate acceptance algorithm results
in the following allocation: Y = {{h1, d1, d2, d3} , {h2, d4}} , which is not
individually rational, because h1 would like to fire d2. However, truth-telling
is an NE because any agent but d1 is assigned to her preferred hospital, but
d1 has no profitable deviations.
The failure of the immediate acceptance mechanism in implementing indi-
vidually rational allocations relies on the multiple-round structure of the
mechanism. Therefore, we consider the game derived from the immedi-
ate acceptance mechanism, where the first-round allocation, Y 1, is the fi-
nal one. We call this mechanism the one-shot immediate acceptance
mechanism. Formally, let  D= ( d)d2D be a profile of preferences for doc-
tors, and let ( h)h2H be hospital priorities. Define OS
 
( d)d2D , H
 
=
CH
 S
d2D Y
1
 d
 
. The game induced by the one-shot immediate acceptance
mechanism is OS=  D, D,L  2Xd  , OS (·, H) .
Notice the structure of OS is very similar to the structure of game  , where
doctors make the proposal. Indeed, the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the
two games coincide.
Proposition 8 The set of NE outcomes of the game induced by the one-shot
immediate acceptance mechanism coincides with the set of NE outcomes of
game  . Then
a) All NE outcomes of OS are pairwise stable allocations.
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b) If preferences are substitutable, all NE outcomes of OS are stable alloca-
tions.
c) If  D are substitutable and  H are unilateral substitutable, OS has an
NE.
d) If   are substitutable, the set of NE outcomes of OS is a non-empty
lattice with respect to the Blair’s order.
e) If  D are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand and  H
are substitutable, the hospital-optimal stable allocation is an NE outcome of
OS.
The immediate acceptance mechanism and the one-shot immediate accep-
tance mechanism are equivalent when priorities are responsive. However,
when one relaxes the assumption of complete information, the one-shot im-
mediate acceptance mechanism makes an agent more likely to end without
signing any contract, preventing an eﬃcient allocation from being achieved.
The immediate acceptance mechanism allows information to be revealed and
agents’ preferences to be expressed along the diﬀerent stages of the mecha-
nism as the following example shows.
Example 9 Let H = {h1, h2} and let D = {d1, d2}. Doctors only know their
own preferences. The priority of the hospitals are  h1= h2 : d1   d2. Each
hospital has quota q = 1. Each doctor can be of two independent types a
or b. The preferences of the doctors are represented by the following utility
functions: udi (d1 | a) = udi (d2 | b) = 2, udi (d2 | a) = udi (d1 | b) = 1, and
udi (; | a) = udi (; | b) = 0. Doctor d1 is of type a with probability p, and
doctor d2 is of type a with probability 12 .
Assume the immediate acceptance mechanism is employed. Let p  12 . A
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists where both doctors reveal their pref-
erences. The payoﬀ of doctor d1 is 2 and the payoﬀ of doctor d2 is 2   p.
Now let p > 12 . A unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists where doctor d1
33
reveals her preferences and doctor d2 ranks her second option as the first one
and her first option as the second one. The payoﬀ of doctor d1 is 2 and the
payoﬀ of doctor d2 is 1 + p.
Assume the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism is employed. Then,
in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium, both doctors reveal their first options. The
payoﬀ of doctor d1 is 2, the interim payoﬀ of doctor d2 of type a is 2   2p,
and the interim payoﬀ of doctor d2 of type b is 2p. Furthermore, doctor d1 is
left without any position with strictly positive probability.
Both when p  12 and when p > 12 , the one-shot immediate acceptance mech-
anism always yields a strictly higher interim expected payoﬀ than the imme-
diate acceptance mechanism to doctor d2.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied a simple mechanism called the simultaneous
acceptance mechanism or SAM . The SAM is a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism
where hospitals make their oﬀers simultaneously and then doctors accept or
reject them simultaneously. The mechanism is well known and mimics real-
world environments, allowing us to explore the allocative implications of the
use of contracts in many-to-many matching markets.
The SAM generalizes previous results in many-to-many matching markets
(Sotomayor, 2004; Echenique and Oviedo, 2006) to the many-to-many match-
ing markets with contracts environment. The SAM also allows us to prove the
existence of pairwise stable allocations when one side of the market has sub-
stitutable preferences and the other side has unilaterally substitutable pref-
erence. This extends the existence result provided by Hatfield and Kominers
(2017). Moreover, when restricted to the many-to-one case, the procedures
coincide with the mechanisms presented in Alcalde et al. (1998) and Alcalde
and Romero-Medina (2000), unifying their implementation results, with and
without transferable utility.
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We extend our findings on the SAM to the general class of take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀers mechanisms or TOM . All the mechanisms in this newly defined class
weakly implement the set of pairwise stable allocations in SPE when the
doctors’ preferences are unilaterally substitutable and hospitals’ preferences
are substitutable. The SAM is not the only mechanism in the TOM class
that has been previously analyzed in the literature. Another interesting el-
ement of the TOM class is the mechanism where doctors accept proposals
one at a time in an order that has been previously established at the begin-
ning of the game. This member of the TOM class extends the mechanisms
introduced by Romero-Medina and Triossi (2014) (see also Klaus and Klijn,
2016) to many-to-many matching markets with contracts.
The inability of the mechanism in the TOM class to fully implement the set of
pairwise stable allocation when the preferences are unilaterally substitutable
gives us insight on the strategic limitation of the market mechanism. These
limitations are important, because a class of simple sequential mechanisms
is able to perform well in a complex environment.
Finally, we apply our findings to the school admissions problem. We show the
extension of the school choice problem to the many-to-many case is not triv-
ial, because we can no longer rely on strategy-proof mechanisms. However,
we can guarantee the allocation of stable allocations in equilibria of the im-
mediate acceptance mechanism as long as schools have responsive priorities.
If the priorities of the schools are not responsive, the immediate acceptance
mechanism can produce allocations that are not individually rational. In this
case, the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism guarantees the imple-
mentation of stable allocations.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume s⇤ is an SPE, and let Y be the outcome
from s⇤. We will show by contradiction that Y is a pairwise stable allocation.
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We first prove Y is an individually rational allocation. The proof of the claim
is by contradiction. Assume Y is not an individually rational allocation for
agent n 2 N . Let n = h 2 H; then Ch (Yh) is a profitable deviation, from
IRC, yielding a contradiction. Let n = d 2 D; in this case, the contradiction
follows from Lemma 1.
We conclude the proof by showing Y is not pairwise blocked. By contradic-
tion, assume a hospital h, a doctor d, and a contract x 2 X \ Y exist with
xD = d, xH = h such that x 2 Ch (Y [ {x}) \ Cd (Y [ {x}).
First, we prove x 2 Cd
⇣S
s⇤
h0D=d
{s⇤h0} [ {x}
⌘
. Set Z =
S
s
⇤
h0D=d
{s⇤h0}. From
Lemma 1, Cd (Z) = Yd. By contradiction, assume x /2 Cd
⇣S
s⇤
h0D=d
{s⇤h0} [ {x}
⌘
=
Cd (Z [ {x}). From x 2 Cd (Yd [ {x}) , it follows that Cd (Z [ {x})  d
Cd (Xd [ {x}). However, because x /2 Cd (Z [ {x}), Cd (Z [ {x}) = Cd (Z) =
Xd, yielding a contradiction.
Set T = {y | y 2 s⇤h, y /2 Ch (Y [ {x}) , yD 6= d}. T is the set of oﬀers that h
made in equilibrium to doctors diﬀerent than d who don’t have contracts in
Ch (Y [ {x}). Consider the following deviation for h, sh = (s⇤h [ {x})\T . In
the subgame induced by this deviation, doctor d is oﬀered the contracts inS
s⇤
h0D=d
{s⇤h0} [ {x}. From IRC and Lemma 1, it follows that the deviation
is profitable to h, yielding a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Y be a stable allocation. We will construct
an equilibrium yielding Y as the outcome. If brh (Y h) = Yh for all h 2 H,
the proof is complete. Otherwise, let Th 6= Yh be such that Th = brh (Y h).
Then Th = Ch (Yh [ Th), and thus Ch (Yh [ {t}) is a profitable deviation for
h for all t 2 Th \ Yh. Let T =
 S
h2H Th
  \ Y .
Let t 2 T . Because Y is pairwise stable, preferences are substitutable and
satisfy UA. d 2 D, y 2 Y exist such that yH = tH = h, yD = tD = d
such that t 2 Ch (Y [ {t}) \ Cd ((Y \ {y}) [ {t}) and y /2 Cd (Y [ {t}). Be-
cause the market is contestable, t0 = t0 (t) 2 X and h0 6= h exist such that t0 2
Cd ((Y \ {y}) [ {t, t0}), t /2 Cd ((Y \ {y}) [ {t, t0}) , and t0 /2 Cd ((Y ) [ {t, t0}).
Set Y 0 = Y [St2T t0 (t). Let Sh = Y 0h for all h 2 H. Observe that, by con-
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struction, Yh = brh (S h). Furthermore, t0 (t) 2 Rh
 
Y 0h, Y
0
 h
 
because Y is
stable and  D are substitutable. It follows that (Sh)h2H is an NE of   yield-
ing Y as the outcome, which completes the proof of the claim. Proof of
Lemma 3. (i) First we show brh (S h) is a best response to S h, and for any
best response Yh, brh (S h) ✓ Yh. Notice g (brh (S h) , S h) = brh (S h). Let
Yh be a best response and let Y 0h = CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ Yh
⌘
h
= (g (Yh, S h))h.
To complete the proof of the claim, we show brh (S h) = Y 0h ✓ Yh. Let
x 2 Y 0h. Because ( d)d2D satisfy UA, x 2 CxD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘
. Thus,
Y 0h ✓
n
x 2 Xh | x 2 CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘o
. In particular, brh (S h) ⌫h Y 0h.
The set Yh is a best response to S h, so Y 0h ⌫h brh (S h). Because preferences
are strict, brh (S h) = Y 0h.
(ii) Now, we show that if Yh is a best response to S h, then Yh ✓ BRh (S h).
Observe that Yh is a best response to S h if and only if
h
CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ Yh
⌘i
h
=
brh (S h). Let Yh be a best response. From part (i) of the proof, we have
Yh = brh (S h) [ Zh for some Zh ✓ Xh, Zh \ brh (S h) = ;. From IRC,
it follows that z /2
n
x 2 Xh | x 2 CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ brh (S h) [ {z}
⌘o
for all
z 2 Zh; therefore, Yh ✓ BRh (S h).
(iii) Let brh (S h) ✓ Yh ✓ BRh (S h). We can write Yh = brh (S h) [
Zh, where Zh ✓
n
x 2 Xh | x /2 CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ brh (S h) [ {x}
⌘o
and Zh \
brh (S h) = ;. By contradiction, assume CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ Yh
⌘
h
6= brh (S h).
Therefore, z 2 Zh exists such that z 2 CzD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ brh (S h) [ Zh
⌘
.
The UA and IRC imply Cd
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ brh (S h) [ Zh
⌘
=
Cd
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ brh (S h) [ {z}
⌘
. In particular,
z 2 Czd
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ brh (S h) [ {z}
⌘
, yielding a contradiction.
The following Lemmas 7 and 8 will be used in the proof of Proposition 3. In
particular, Lemma 7 will be repeatedly used in the proof of Lemma 8.
Lemma 7 (i) Rh (Sh, S h) is increasing in Sh, for all S h: if S 0h ✓ Sh, then
Rh (S 0h, S h) ✓ Rh (Sh, S h).
40
(ii) Brh (S h) = brh (S h) [ (Xh \ Fh (S h)) is a best response.
(iii) Assume  D are unilaterally substitutable. Let h 2 H. If S 0h0 ✓ Sh0 ✓ Xh0
for all h0 2 H \ {h}, then Fh (S h) ✓ Fh
 
S 0 h
 
.
(iv) Assume  D are unilaterally substitutable and  H are substitutable. Let
h 2 H. If S 0h0 ✓ Sh0 ✓ Xh0, for all h0 2 H \{h}, then brh
 
S 0 h
  ✓ Brh (S h).
(v) Assume  D is substitutable. Assume S 0h0 ✓ Sh0 ✓ Xh0 for all h0 2 H;
then Rh
 
(S 0h0)h02H
  ✓ Rh  (Sh0)h02H  for all h 2 H.
(vi) Assume  D and  H are substitutable. If S 0h0 ✓ Sh0 ✓ Xh0 for all h0 2
H \ {h}, then brh
 
S 0 h
  ✓ BRh (S h).
Proof. (i) Let S 0h ✓ Sh, and let x /2 CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ S 0h [ {x}
⌘
. We
prove by contradiction that x /2 CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ Sh [ {x}
⌘
. Assume x 2
CD
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ Sh [ {x}
⌘
. The UA and IRC imply⇣
Cd
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ Sh [ {x}
⌘⌘
=
⇣
Cd
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ S 0h [ {x}
⌘⌘
h
for all d, reach-
ing a contradiction. Therefore, Rh (S 0h, S h) ✓ Rh (S 0h, S h).
(ii) NoticeXh\Fh (S h) = Rh (;, S h). From (i)Rh (;, S h) ✓ Rh (brh (S h) , S h);
then brh (S h) [ (Xh \ Fh (S h)) ✓ BRh (S h), which implies the claim.
(iii) Let x 2 Fh (S h); then x 2 Cd
⇣S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘
, where d = xD.
Notice h /2
hS
h0 6=h S
0
h0
i
H
. Because  d is unilaterally substitutable, x 2
Cd
⇣S
h0 6=h S
0
h0 [ {x}
⌘
.
(iv) We have brh
 
S 0 h
 
= Ch
 
Fh
 
S 0 h
  \Fh (S h)[ Ch  Fh  S 0 h   \ Fh (S h) .
From (iii) Fh (S h) ✓ Fh
 
S 0 h
 
. Therefore, the substitutability of  h implies
Ch
 
Fh
 
S 0 h
   \ Fh (S h) ✓ Ch (Fh (S h)), which concludes the proof of the
claim.
(v) The claims follows directly from the definition of substitutability of  D.
(vi) From (iv), brh
 
S 0 h
  ✓ Brh (S h) ✓ BRh (S h).
The next result will be used in the proof of Propositions 3 and 4.
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Lemma 8 Assume  D are unilaterally substitutable and  H are substitutable.
Let h 2 H. If S 0h0 ✓ Sh0 ✓ Xh0, for all h0 2 H \ {h}. Then Brh
 
S 0 h
  ✓
Brh (S h).
Proof. (i) The proof of the result follows from (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 7
above.
Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows directly from Lemmas 8 and
7.
Proof of Lemma 4. To complete the proof, it suﬃces to showRh
 
brh
 
S 0 h
 
, S 0 h
  ✓
Rh (brh (S h) , S h), or equivalently,Xh\Rh (brh (S h) , S h) ✓ Xh\Rh
 
brh
 
S 0 h
 
, S 0 h
 
.
We prove the claim by contradiction. Let x 2 CD
⇣
brh (S h) [
S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘
\
Xh, and assume x /2 CD
⇣
brh
 
S 0 h
  [Sh0 6=h S 0h0 [ {x}⌘. From Lemma 7 (vi),
we have brh
 
S 0 h
  ✓ BRh (S h) = brh (S h)[Rh (brh (S h) , S h). From sub-
stitutability, x /2 CD
⇣
brh (S h) [Rh (brh (S h) , S h) [
S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘
. From
IRC it follows thatCD
⇣
brh (S h) [Rh (brh (S h) , S h) [
S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘
=
= CD
⇣
brh (S h) [Rh (brh (S h) , S h) [
S
h0 6=h Sh0
⌘
=
CD
⇣
brh (S h) [
S
h0 6=h Sh0
⌘
. It follows that x /2 CD
⇣
brh (S h) [
S
h0 6=h Sh0 [ {x}
⌘
,
reaching a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 5. The set of fixed points of BR is a subset of the set
of Nash equilibrium of  , so it suﬃces to show that any NE outcome is the
outcome of a fixed point of BR. Let X 0 be an SPE outcome, and let (Yh)h2H
be an NE of   yielding X 0 as outcome.
Let h 2 H. We have Yh = X 0h [ Zh, where Zh ✓ Rh (X 0h, X 0 h) (see Lemma
3). Notice X 0h = brh (Y h) ✓ BRh (Y h). It follows that Yh ✓ BRh (Y h)
for all h 2 H. Consider the sequence T 0 = Y , T k+1 =
⇣ 
BRh
 
T k h
  
h2H
⌘
for all k   0. Notice that, by construction, brh
 
T k h
 
= X 0h for all h 2 H.
Because T 0 ✓ T 1 and BR is increasing, the sequence  T k 
k 0 is increasing
in k. Because X is finite, K   0 exists such that TK = T s for all s   K. It
follows that T is a fixed point of BR yielding X 0 as an outcome.
42
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) First, we show two preliminary results.
(a) Let (Ah)h2H and (Bh)h2H be fixed points of BR such that Ah ✓ Bh for
all h 2 H. We show XB = CD
 
XA [XB , where XA = g  (Ah)h2H  and
XB = g
 
(Bh)h2H
 
. Let A =
S
h2H Ah and B =
S
h2H Bh and notice A ✓ B.
We have XB = CD (B) = CD (A [ B). Because XA [XB ✓ A [B, we have
XB = CD
 
XA [XB .
(b) Let (Ah)h2H and (Bh)h2H be fixed points ofBR, and letXA = g
 
(Ah)h2H
 
and XB = g
 
(Bh)h2H
 
. Assume XB = CD
 
XA [XB . We show Ah ✓ Bh
for all h 2 H. Notice XA = CH
 
XA [XB  (see Pepa Risma, 2015). Let
x 2 XA \ XB. We prove x 2 BRh (B h) . Let h = xH and let d = xD.
By substitutability of  h, x 2 Ch
 
XB [ {x} . From the pairwise sta-
bility of XB x /2 Cd
 
XB [ {x} . Because  d are substitutable, we have
x /2 Cd
⇣
XB [Sh0 6=hBh0⌘; thus, x 2 Rh  XB, B h  ✓ BRh (B h).
Now let x 2 Rh
 
XA, A h
  \Xh and let d = xD. We have
Cd
⇣
XA [Sh0 6=hAh0 [ {x}⌘ = XAh soXAd = Cd  XA [ {x} . From the substi-
tutability of d, we obtain x /2 Cd
 
XA [XB [ {x}  = XB as Cd  XA [XB [ {x}  =
XB from IRC. It follows that x /2 Cd
 
XB [ {x} . Again, the substitutabil-
ity of  d implies x /2 Cd
⇣
XB [Sh0 6=hBh0⌘; thus, x 2 Rh  XB, B h  ✓
BRh (B h).
It follows that Ah = XAh [ Rh
 
XAh , A h
  ✓ XBh [ Rh  XBh , B h  for all
h 2 H.10
The claim follows from (a) and (b) and Lemma 5. Notice the set of fixed
points of BR is a non-empty lattice from the Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem.
(ii) The claim follows from (i) and Pepa Risma, 2015).
Proof of Proposition 5. Let Y be the hospital-optimal stable allocation.
We will construct an equilibrium yielding Y as an outcome. If brh (Y h) = Yh
for all h 2 H, the proof is complete. Otherwise, let Th 6= Yh be such that
Th = brh (Y h). Then Th = Ch (Yh [ Th), and thus Ch (Yh [ {t}) is a prof-
10See Lemma 3
43
itable deviation for h for all t 2 Th \ Yh. Let T =
 S
h2H Th
  \ Y .
Let t 2 T . Because Y is pairwise stable, and preferences are substitutable
and satisfy UA, d 2 D, y 2 Y exist such that yH = tH = h, yD = tD = d
such that t 2 Ch (Y [ {t}) \ Cd ((Y \ {y}) [ {t}) and y /2 Cd (Y [ {t}).
Preferences H satisfy the law of aggregate demand; thus, |Ch (Y )|  |Ch (Y [ {t})|.
Because Y is individually rational and y /2 Ch (Y [ {t}), then Ch (Y [ {t}) =
(Yh \ {y}) [ {t}. Observe that Cd ((Y \ {y}) [ {t}) = (Yd \ {y}) [ {t}, be-
cause preferences are substitutable and Cd (Cd (Y [ {t})) = Y .
Next consider Z = (Y \ {y}) [ {t}. Because preferences are substitutable,
allocation Z is individually rational and Z  H Y . In particular, Z is not
stable. Because Y is stable, t0 = t0 (t) 2 X and h0 6= h exist such that
t0 2 Ch0 (Y [ {t}) \ Cd ((Yd \ {y}) [ {t, t0}) and t /2 Cd ((Yd \ {y}) [ {t, t0}).
Set Y 0 = Y [ St2T t0 (t). Let Sh = Y 0h for all h 2 H. Observe that, by
construction, Yh = brh (S h). Furthermore, t0 (t) 2 Rh
 
Y 0h, Y
0
 h
 
because Y
is stable and  D are substitutable. It follows that (Sh)h2H is an NE of  
yielding Y as an outcome, which completes the proof of the claim.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let (S⇤d) be a NE of   when the preferences of
the students are given by  D. For all d 2 D, let  ⇤d such that Y 1 ⇤d = S⇤d and
Y r ⇤d = ; for all r > 1. Because (S⇤d) is an NE of   ,  ⇤D is an NE of the
game induced by the immediate acceptance mechanism.
Now let  ⇤D be an NE of IA yielding allocation Y as the outcome. For all
d 2 D and h 2 H, let rd be the step of the algorithm where doctor d was
removed. For all d 2 D, let S⇤d = Y rd . We prove (S⇤d)d2D is an NE of  
yielding Y as the outcome.
Let Z be the outcome of (S⇤d)d2D in  . By construction, Z ✓ Y . Because
 H is responsive, Y is individually rational and Z = Y .
By contradiction, assume (S⇤d)d2D is not an NE of  . Then d 2 D exists
such that Cd
n
x | x 2 CH
⇣S
d0 6=D Yd0 [ {x}
⌘o
6= Yd. Let  0d such that Y 1 0d =
Cd
n
x | x 2 CH
⇣S
d0 6=D Yd0 [ {x}
⌘o
and Y r 0d = ; for all r > 1. The deviation
 0d is a profitable deviation from strategy  ⇤d when all other agents play  ⇤ d
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in game IA, which yields a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 8. We first prove that if ( ⇤d)d2D is an NE of OS,
then
⇣
Y 1 ⇤d
⌘
d2D
is an NE of  . Notice OS
 
( ⇤d)d2D
 
= g
⇣⇣
Y 1 ⇤d
⌘
d2D
⌘
. The
proof is by contradiction. Assume
⇣
Y 1 ⇤d
⌘
d2D
is not an NE of  . Then d0 2 D
and Y 0 ✓ Xd0 exist such that
✓
g
✓
Y 0,
⇣
Y 1 ⇤d
⌘
d 6=d0
◆◆
d0
 d0
 
g
 
(A ( ⇤d))d2D
  
d0 ,
where g is the outcome function of  . Let  0d0 be any preference profile for d0
where the set Y 0 is ranked first, which is Y 1 0
d0
= Y 0. Then  0d0 is a profitable
deviation for d0 in game OR, yielding a contradiction.
Next, we prove that if (Sd)d2D is an NE of   yielding allocation Y as the out-
come, then anNE of  ⇤,
 
( ⇤d)d2D
 
exists yielding g
 
(Sd)d2D
 
. For all d 2 D,
let  ⇤d be any preference profile on 2Xh such that Sd is ranked first, which is
Y 1 ⇤d = Sd for all d 2 D. Then OS
 
( ⇤d)d2D
 
= g
 
(Sd)d2D
 
. We next prove by
contradiction that
 
( ⇤d)d2D
 
is an NE of  ⇤. Assume ( ⇤d)d2D is not an NE
of  ⇤. Then d0 2 D and  0d0 exist such that
⇣
OS
⇣
 0d0 , ( ⇤d)d 6=d0
⌘⌘
d0
 d0 
OS
 
( ⇤d)d2D
  
d0 . It follows that
⇣
g
⇣
Y 1 d0 ,, S d
⌘⌘
d0
 d0
 
g
 
(Sd)d2D
  
d0 ,
yielding a contradiction.
Thus, claim (a) follows from Proposition 1, claim (b) follows from Corollary
1, claim (c) follows from Proposition 3, claim (d) follows from Theorem 4,
and claim (e) follows from Proposition 5.
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